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Abstract 
The concept of human agency refers to whether or not free will exists. Over the 
course of history, several philosophers and psychologists have debated this particular 
topic. As a result, three divergent schools of thought have emerged. One such school 
posits the doctrine of free will; another articulates the doctrine of determinism. Still 
another school of thought holds that free will and determinism cannot exist outside of 
one another. This concept is called compatibilism. Human agency is a necessary 
contextualization for the scope of the present study. While the debate of human 
agency has not been fully resolved, this study is concerned with the implications of 
the belief in agency. Individual belief in free will is referred to as sense of agency. 
Researchers have indicated that the mere belief in free will or determinism produces 
cognitive and behavioral effects. A higher belief in free will is correlated with 
positive cognitive benefits and prosocial behaviors. A diminished sense of agency is 
correlated with negative cognitive effects and antisocial behaviors. The present study 
seeks to determine if sense of agency could be primed and subsequently enhanced. If 
enhanced, the study seeks to determine if a heightened belief in free will leads to an 
increased exhibition of prosocial behaviors. The present study included the 
participation of 130 individuals. No significant data was found. 
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Sense of Agency and the Exhibition Prosocial Behaviors 
Philosophers have often debated the notion of whether or not human beings 
possess and exercise free will. Free will has been defined as the idea that human 
beings possess the capability to control the course of their lives through their own 
thoughts and actions (Feldman, 2017). Alternatively, those on the opposite side of 
this debate hold the belief that humans are in fact subject to the doctrine of 
determinism. Determinism is characterized by the idea that “every event or action, 
including human action is the inevitable result of preceding events and actions and 
the laws of nature” (Caruso, 2016, p.1). Although this was originally a debate 
between schools of philosophy in antiquity, over time psychology has become 
intermittently intertwined with the idea of free will. When examining this question, 
however, psychologists have typically sought to determine not whether human 
agency exists, but rather the empirical implications of the belief in free will. 
 Psychological researchers have shown that the mere belief or disbelief in the 
subject of free will powerfully influences human behavior and cognition. 
Contemporary researchers have indicated that a greater belief in determinism has 
been correlated with undesirable social behavior. For example, researchers have 
suggested that disbelief in “free will led to an increase in aggression and a reduction 
in willingness to help” (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009, p. 267). Such a 
conclusion stems from the notion that a lack of free will belief ultimately reduces 
motivation and effort in an individual. Conversely, a higher belief in free will has 
been shown to produce prosocial behavior in humans. Additionally, a variety of 
cognitive benefits have also been associated with a higher sense of agency 
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(Baumeister & Brewer 2012; Clark et al., 2014; Moore, 2016). Such cognitive 
benefits include higher self-efficacy and attributions of moral responsibility. Evidence 
from Baumeister & Brewer (2012) indicated that high free will belief is “correlated 
with finding life as more meaningful, with higher life satisfaction” (p. 8). Ultimately, 
it appears there is an inherent correlation between sense of agency and humanistic 
behaviors and cognitions.  
 Based upon my review of the current research, there is a gap in the literature. 
The current research suggests that a higher disbelief in sense of agency typically leads 
to antisocial behaviors. Conversely, researchers have indicated that an increased sense 
of agency has led to the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Cognitive benefits have 
also been linked to this enhanced sense of agency. As a result, because this 
correlation exists, sense of agency could help engender prosocial behaviors, while at 
the same time reducing antisocial behaviors. Such a correlation could potentially 
produce significant impacts for the improvement of society and individual cognitions. 
Aarts & Van den Bos (2011) posited that evidence of free will belief inherently 
primes individual sense of agency. However, beyond this experiment, researchers 
have largely neglected any attempt at enhancing free will belief. While the 
contemporary psychological research illustrates such an association between human 
agency and behavior, a gap exists wherein the enhancement of sense of agency, and 
its resulting correlates, has been under researched. As a result, the corresponding 
question to the present study is whether sense of agency can be enhanced and, if so, 
whether it results in increased manifestation of prosocial behaviors.  
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 The hypotheses associated with this study, labeled as H1 and H2, are as 
follows:  
 H1: Individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and 
subsequently enhanced.  
 H2: Enhanced sense of agency will ultimately increase the exhibition of 
prosocial behaviors, as seen in individuals in the experimental group 
compared to the control group.  
To examine these hypotheses, an experimental study was conducted that contained 
two experimental conditions and one control condition. All participants completed a 
pre/post questionnaire measuring their sense of agency. Between these measures, 
participants read a vignette that was altered in accordance with the group to which 
they were randomly assigned. After the completion of the post questionnaire, 
individuals were provided an opportunity to participate in an act of prosocial 
behavior. Immediately subsequent to the post-questionnaire, through means of 
deception, this opportunity was introduced through an online invitation to participate 
in a volunteer opportunity outside the scope of this study. The exhibition of the 
behavior (i.e., agreeing to participate in the prosocial act) determined the validity of 
the hypothesis.  
Literature Review 
 Philosophers and psychologists have continually engaged in debate 
concerning the existence of human agency. Human agency refers to the idea that an 
individual has the capacity to act independently from external influences and to 
control their choices based on free will. From this overarching debate, multiple 
SENSE OF AGENCY 8 
schools of thought and theorists have emerged. One such school contains doctrines of 
free will, which presupposes that humans have direct influence over their choices. 
Within this particular domain, Immanuel Kant and Carl Rogers produced theories in 
an effort to provide evidence for the existence of human agency. Opposite to this 
sphere of thought is the school of determinism. Determinism posits that humans are 
subject to external forces and do not have influence over their choices. Baruch 
Spinoza and B.F. Skinner espoused doctrines of determinism within their respective 
fields of practice. Finally, a third school developed that argued that free will and 
determinism exist simultaneously. This field, known as compatibilism, has 
experienced recognition due to the influence of existentialists such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Ludwig Binswanger, and Medard Boss.  
Theories regarding the existence of human agency are imperative for the 
contextualization of human sense of agency. Doctrines concerning the existence of 
human agency have influenced and provided a basis for the construction of the 
concept of individual sense of agency. Sense of agency refers to individual belief in 
the concept of free will. Contemporary researchers have built upon the original debate 
and focused on both the cognitive and behavioral effects of belief in free will. 
Individuals who possess greater levels of sense of agency typically experience 
positive cognitive effects. In addition, these individuals display a heightened 
exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, lower levels of sense of agency are 
correlated with negative cognitive effects and antisocial behaviors. As a result, 
priming and enhancing levels of sense of agency possesses the capacity to benefit 
both the individual and the collective. In the pages that follow, both the doctrines 
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related to agency and the psychological construct of the sense of agency will be fully 
explored.    
Doctrines of Free Will 
 Historically, a variety of philosophers have produced theories espousing 
doctrines of free will. Immanuel Kant systematically constructed an argument 
advocating human agency (Kant, 1972, 2013). Such advocacy fundamentally relied 
upon certain ontological and epistemological considerations. When considering the 
notion of metaphysics, Kant argued for two ontologically distinct categories, the 
phenomenal and the noumenal (Kant, 2013). The phenomenal world encompasses 
elements that appear to humans insofar as they are perceivers. Conversely, the 
noumenal world represents elements as they are in themselves, as they exist 
independently of how they appear (Yu, 2011). Humans, as a result of the existence of 
these two categories, naturally exist in a state of duality.  Stemming from such 
metaphysics, Kant substantiated his epistemology through reason and cognitive 
faculties. As in the case of Kantian metaphysics, a duality is consequently established 
for the explication of human knowledge. Knowledge, according to Kant, is derived 
through two divergent manners. Humans possess the ability to attain knowledge 
through a posteriori and a priori means. A posteriori is empiricist in nature and 
asserts that knowledge is known dependent upon experience. However, Kant 
additionally argued from a rationalist perspective that certain knowledge is known a 
priori, independent of individual experience (Hanna, 2016; Kant, 2013).  
 Based upon such metaphysical and epistemological foundations, Kant 
consequently sought to establish a basis for human freedom. Human free will, as Kant 
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argued, could not exist in the phenomenal realm. All natural events in this world were 
subject to deterministic causes. As a result, freedom must necessarily exist as a 
transcendental idea in the objective noumenal world. According to Kant, contained 
within this noumenal world is an intuitively accepted “fact of reason” that humans are 
subject to an axiom of morality (Kant, 1997). Morality, as a concept, inherently 
presupposes the determination of reason and consequently implicates humans as 
rational beings. Rational agents, as in the case of humans, are implicitly conscious of 
the binding laws of morality (Cureton & Johnson, 2016; Kant, 1972). Kant argued 
that such morality consists in and ultimately depends upon the faculty of reason. 
Without the assumption of freedom, however, reason is ultimately unable to act. 
When considering the concept of reason, freedom inherently represents an 
indispensible practical function. As a result, rational beings possess an unavoidable 
interest in thinking of themselves as free through reason. The ability to perform 
judgments and apply reason systematically elevates rational beings outside the realm 
of determinism (Kant 1972). Analysis of Kant’s argument reveals that the implicit 
awareness of morality produces implications of rationality, which implies free will. 
Thus, according to Kant, humans cannot exhibit rational functioning and possess 
moral capacities without freedom.  
Immanuel Kant produced theories that fundamentally represent the 
philosophical underpinnings of free will. Psychologists, such as Carl Rogers, 
eventually became intimately involved in this philosophical consideration. This 
psychological involvement emerged out of the observation that human cognition and 
perception can influence the philosophical debate. Originally, two branches of 
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psychology dominated the entire field. These two primary branches, behaviorism and 
psychoanalysis, were intimately influenced by deterministic perceptions and 
approaches (Mounier et al., 2015).  Both schools explicated the notion that humans 
were subject to external forces outside of individual control. Eventually, this 
deterministic dominance sparked the emergence and subsequent movement of a new 
school of thought, humanistic psychology. In stark contrast to previous schools, 
humanism emerged to explicate the freedom of humans. Humanists believed that both 
psychoanalytic and behavioral schools neglected the conscious existence of 
individuals. Behaviorism was perceived as mechanistic, while psychoanalysis 
appeared reductionist in nature (Mounier et al., 2015). As a result of these beliefs, 
humanistic psychologists sought to establish the principle that humans were unique 
beings who possess awareness. This is manifested in the form of human 
consciousness (Greening, 2006). Consequently, humanism is characterized by a focus 
on individual growth and potential. Such a conscious desire for fulfillment and 
growth functionally illustrates behavioral motivations. These motivations inherently 
suggest that humans possess personal agency that arises through intentionality and 
choice. As a result, humans utilize the notion of free will to achieve full potential as 
rational beings.  
 Carl Rogers is considered the most influential figure in humanistic 
psychology. His theory deals primarily with the development of personality in 
individuals (Rogers, 1959). This development of personality, however, systematically 
relies on and substantiates the philosophical consideration of free will. Such 
establishment develops primarily through structural and motivational constructs. 
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Analysis of Roger’s theory reveals that human experiences exist principally in what 
he calls the phenomenal field (Rogers, 1959). The phenomenal field encompasses all 
that is experienced by the organism, whether or not consciously perceived. Rogers 
identified the self as a conscious aspect of the phenomenal field, which comprises all 
aspects of experiences and being that exist in individual awareness (Pescitelli, 1996). 
This self-concept is never complete and exists in a constant state of growth. As a 
result, evaluation of this self-concept develops a consistent underlying motivational 
construct. Humans, according to Rogers, possess an innate disposition towards an 
actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1959). The actualizing tendency is characterized by the 
desire to fulfill one’s potential and align with the organismic self. “All living 
organisms strive to maintain, further, and actualize their experience” (Mueller, 2017a, 
slide 11). As a result, behavior does not deterministically occur due to the past. 
Rather, behavior is facilitated by the inclination to embody how one perceives 
themself to exist. According to Rogers, such a tendency is naturally directional and is 
an outward movement towards inherent autonomy, as the awareness of self and the 
motivation for growth to achieve one’s potential ultimately act as a presupposition to 
free will. 
 When considering the debate concerning the existence of human agency, free 
will encompasses a prominent school of thought. Free will is the idea that individuals 
possess the capacity to control their choices and have direct influence over the 
environment around. Immanuel Kant and Carl Rogers represent two theorists who 
posit doctrines of free will in their respective fields. From a philosophical perspective, 
Kant argued for free will primarily on account of ontological and epistemological 
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considerations. Due to the human faculty of reason, Kant argues that human agency 
must necessarily exist. Psychologically, Rogers claimed the existence of free will 
through the establishment of structural and motivational constructs in human 
personality. Individual awareness and the actualizing tendency illustrate these 
assertions by Rogers. Kant and Rogers ultimately represent advocates of human 
agency albeit from two independent domains of influence.  
Doctrines of Determinism  
 It is evident that multiple theories were developed in an attempt to prove the 
philosophical assumption of free will. Two theories of free will, articulated by Kant 
and Rogers, have been explored. Due to the exposition of theories on free will, 
deterministic considerations arose in an effort to refute the concept of human 
freedom. Baruch Spinoza fundamentally disagreed with the theoretical assumptions 
of freedom and consequently posited the existence of determinism. Such propositions 
emerged and relied upon metaphysical characteristics. For Spinoza, everything in 
existence possessed the property of being either a substance or a mode (Spinoza, 
2009). A substance is characterized as something that exists independently and does 
not need anything to subsist. Conversely, a mode is a property, which needs a 
substance to exist (Astore, 2016). Previous theorists articulated the notion that 
substances were abundant throughout the universe. Spinoza, however, rejected this 
traditional view and contended that God, also identified as nature, is the only 
substance (Spinoza, 2009). 
The establishment of substance monism represents the fundamental basis of 
Spinoza’s argument for determinism. According to Spinoza, in order for an entity to 
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be considered free, the being must exist solely by the necessity of its own nature 
(Spinoza, 2009). In addition, the actions of the entity must be determined by itself 
alone. Spinoza contended that except in the case of God, no substance could be 
conceived. God represents the only conception of causa sui, something engendered 
through itself (Spinoza, 2009). As a result of this substance monism, the claim that 
one infinite substance is the only substance that exists, a certain brand of immanence 
is inevitably created (Sandum, 2012). God consequently functions as a necessity for 
the existence of all entities. Due to the fact that everything ultimately stems from 
God, the current casual order of events represents the only possible order. These 
metaphysical doctrines thus establish a high degree of causal determination. 
Ontologically, humans exist outside of duality and as an intimate extension of God. 
This extension places humans within the constraints of nature and the governance of 
the laws of mind and body (Kisner, 2011). These attributes are in effect subject to the 
previously established causal determination. “Men believe themselves to be free 
because they are conscious of their own actions and are ignorant of the causes by 
which they are determined” (Lord, 2010, p. 82). Ultimately, for Spinoza, it is 
impossible for humans to exhibit free will, and the properties of determinism must 
remain in full effect (Spinoza, 2009). Accordingly, the sense of free will is an 
epiphenomenon of consciousness of one’s own acts, but not a reality in itself.  
 Upon analysis of psychological models consistent with Spinoza’s 
deterministic philosophical framework, behaviorism appears as a preeminent branch. 
Fundamentally, behaviorism is a theory that relies on a principle of stimulus and 
response. All motivations and subsequent behaviors could thus be reduced to simple 
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associations. Proponents of behaviorism, in its radical form at least, dismiss inward 
experiential aspects and disregard internal mental states and consciousness (Graham, 
2015). Such a sphere focused on observable behaviors that can be strictly perceived 
as the result of external stimuli. These external stimuli typically manifest themselves 
through conditioning. Conditioning is the process whereby behaviors become more 
frequent or predictive in a given environment due to reinforcements. Reinforcements 
are feedback, whether positive or negative, that function as a stimulus subsequent to a 
particular response (Staddon & Cerutti, 2003).  When considering this basis, humans 
are consequently assumed to embody a state of passivity. In addition, the being is 
viewed as a product of tabula rasa, or as possessing a clean slate. Free will then, as a 
concept, possesses the presumption of illusory in nature.  
 In accordance with the deterministic perceptions of behaviorism, B.F. Skinner 
produced radical theoretical assumptions. Skinner was intimately concerned with the 
state of the external world. According to Skinnerian theoretical foundations, the 
driver of behavior is the environment as a result of conditioning (Skinner, 1971). For 
this reason, Skinner believed that a technology of behavior must necessarily be 
produced. However, this technology required that the environment, rather than 
humans be the prime target. Humans, according to Skinner, contained an inherent 
lack of autonomy. This fictional sense of autonomy merely endured as a reinforcing 
agent for the survival of aversive control for the human species (Skinner, 1971). 
Behavior, and motivation as a result, were strictly engendered through the external 
stimuli of the environment. Skinner argued that most behaviors were emitted through 
operant conditioning (Skinner, 1971). Operant conditioning is engendered as an 
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organism produces units of behavior that are sent forth into the environment. Such 
operants are subsequently followed by consequences induced by the environmental 
context. These consequences systematically shape succeeding emitted behavior 
(Staddon & Cerutti, 2003). Responses, which are followed by reinforcements, are 
more likely to occur in the future. Conversely, those behaviors not reinforced are less 
likely to transpire. Behavior consequently “increases or decreases as a result of an 
empirical law of effect” (Mueller, 2017b, slide 3). Humans, according to Skinner, are 
controlled through the environment, which is always the originating source of 
behavior (Skinner, 1971). Multiple apparatuses, both social and non-social, exist to 
exert control over human autonomy. Such assertions support the supposition of 
deterministic considerations.   
 While free will exists as a school of thought on one side of the debate, 
determinism functions as the opposite perspective. Determinism is characterized by 
the idea that humans are essentially subject to external forces and thus exert little 
control over the environment. Baruch Spinoza and B.F. Skinner represent two 
theorists who endorse doctrines of determinism from a philosophical and 
psychological perspective respectively. Spinoza claimed a lack of human agency 
through the establishment of substance monism. Substance monism asserts that God 
is the only conception of causa sui, which requires that humans functionally rely 
upon something external to exist (Spinoza, 2009). This reliance forces human 
existence to be causally determined. Through the establishment of certain 
motivational constructs, Skinner argued for deterministic considerations. The 
environment, which functions as the originating source for behavior, continually 
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conditions humans through reinforcements (Skinner, 1971). These theorists thus 
remove free will from human existence. For these reasons, Spinoza and Skinner 
illustrate proponents of an absence of human agency from two separate spheres of 
influence.  
Doctrines of Compatibilism  
 While the philosophical debate of human agency has typically articulated two 
opposing sides, an alternate school exists. This coalition, known as the compatibilists, 
has elucidated the notion that free will and determinism coexist with one another. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, preeminently classified as an existentialist, systematically 
rejected the separate existence of human freedom and determinism. Such rejection of 
free will arises as a result of an apparent internal contradiction. Free will, according to 
Nietzsche, relies upon the conception of the agent of causa sui (Nietzsche, 1927). The 
concept of causa sui denotes something that is caused or generated within itself. 
Causa sui proposes that human action results from choice, which in effect emerges 
from the will. Will, however, is paradoxically determined by human nature (Grillaert, 
2006). As a result, such a free will argument is inherently circular. In addition, 
Nietzsche identifies a further internal inconsistency in the form of a false dichotomy. 
“The belief in free will presupposes that the agent can be isolated from the act” 
(Grillaert, 2006, p. 44). This dichotomy postulates a dualistic relationship between 
humans and the world. According to Nietzsche, however, this reduces inherent 
complexities to isolation and does not reflect the continuous flow of reality. 
Subsequent to the rejection of free will, Nietzsche undermined the notion of 
determinism. Determinism seemingly produces its origins in the conception of cause 
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and effect. Nietzsche argued that such causality is engendered through false 
comprehensions (Nietzsche, 2007). These false comprehensions occur through the 
error of confusing the effect for the cause, while commonly rejecting the deep cause. 
Additionally, humans commit the error of a false causality whereby non-existent 
inner causalities, such as the human will, are invented. Such inventions arise based on 
individually observed experiences of the will acting as casual. According to 
Nietzsche, however, the inner causes merely accompany actions rather than act as a 
basis for causality (Nietzsche, 2007). As a result, causality is an error of traditional 
human thought. Mechanical necessity thus is not a fact, but rather an interpretation 
(Leiter, 2007). For these reasons, the foundational elements that Kant and Spinoza 
utilized in the debate between free will and determinism are rejected. 
 An analysis of the entirety of Nietzsche’s theory, however, indicates a 
disposition towards compatibilism. While not wholly deterministic, humans are 
inevitably subject to deterministic elements. Such elements manifest in the form of 
psychological characteristics through individual childhood impressions, relationships, 
and environmental stimuli (Grillaert, 2006). In addition, humans experience physical 
determinants in the case of subjugation to natural laws and biological underpinnings. 
For these reasons, evidence suggests that humans innately experience determinism. 
However, Nietzsche also contended that the mere act of reflecting and reasoning on 
the notion of free will systematically supposes inherent human freedom (Leiter, 
2015). Free will, according to Nietzsche, is evident in individual character. Individual 
character constitutes a hierarchy of drives. Sovereign individuals, through the 
command of a strong rather than weak will, can organize these inherent drives 
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(Nietzsche, 1927). A genuine self thus emerges, which guarantees autonomy. Humans 
consequently exist within a deterministic environment, but freedom allows for the 
manifestation of individual consequences of such effects through strength of will. The 
concepts of determinism and free will exist as two antithetical forces whose inherent 
significance relies primarily upon their opposition. As such, the two forces must 
invariably exist as one another, outside a realm of duality. According to Nietzsche, it 
is evident that these two inclinations function as complementary counterbalances of 
one another.  
 Stemming from the philosophical consideration of Nietzsche, multiple 
theorists have applied existentialism to the field of psychology. Prominent among 
these theorists, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss employed these deliberations 
to the development of an existential model of individual personality (Binswanger, 
1965; Boss, 1963). When considering the structural constructs of personality, 
Binswanger and Boss articulated an existential phenomenology of being. Humans do 
not exist in a state of duality, but rather subsist in unity (Rychlak, 1981). 
Phenomenally, humans exist as their ideas and concretely illustrate the centrality of 
existence, the state of being. As a result of this phenomenological assumption, the 
dichotomy of unconsciousness and consciousness is causally rejected. Emanating 
from such a phenomenological outlook is the core theoretical construct of these 
existentialists, the dasein (Rychlak, 1981). The dasein is characterized by the 
existence of being within multiple world designs. These multiple world designs 
encompass human interaction with the eigenwelt (oneself), umwelt (the environment), 
uberwelt (spirituality), and mitwelt (social beings). When considering such existence, 
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Binswanger and Boss fundamentally disagreed upon the derivative of meaning. 
Binswanger argued that existence is endowed with meaning by humans, whereas 
Boss contended that existence discloses its meaning (Binswanger, 1965; Boss, 1963). 
 Human existence within the dasein necessarily produces implications for the 
interplay of determinism and free will. Binswanger and Boss contend that humans are 
thrown within the dasein and thus exist in a state of thrown-ness (Binswanger, 1965). 
Such thrown-ness encompasses the circumstances with which individuals are 
provided. These circumstances exist primarily as a result of biological and 
environmental factors. In addition, spatial and temporal antecedents function as 
imperative influences as well. As a result, thrown-ness represents the existential 
accordance of determinism. Contained within this incidence of being thrown, humans 
possess the innate capacity to experience pitch (Boss, 1963). Pitch is the primary 
motivational construct for Binswanger and Boss as they suggested that humans are 
constantly drawn to possibilities. Fundamentally, pitch allows humans to choose to 
transcend their inherent circumstances and project opposition to the rigidity of a 
seemingly inflexible environment. Existentialists articulate that the central theme in 
existence is to “advance on life actively and assume the responsibility of meeting our 
possibilities to enrich and extend Dasein” (Rychlak, 1981, p. 645). Such a notion of 
pitch allows for a challenge to thrown-ness consequently engendering the exhibition 
of individual autonomy. In addition, existential anxiety arises as a result of a basic 
sense that it is impossible to fulfill every available option in life. The capacity to 
deliberate upon various choices and thereafter attempt to fulfill all options in life 
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further points to this notion of human freedom. As a result, existential psychology 
articulates a necessary interplay between determinism and free will.   
From Agency to Sense of Agency  
 It is evident that philosophers and psychologists have fundamentally disagreed 
over the existence of human sense of agency. Despite such controversy, the field has 
transitioned to determine not whether agency exists, but whether the belief in agency 
engenders effects. Researchers have indicated that the mere belief in the idea of free 
will produces significant effects in the cognitive realm and subsequent behavior of 
humans (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Higher levels of sense of agency have been 
correlated with positive cognitive effects and behaviors. Conversely, a diminished 
sense of agency produces detrimental effects in the realm of cognition and behavior. 
In an effort to ascertain such effects, psychologists have typically assessed the 
consequences of sense of human agency through two separate processes, 
“measurement and experimental manipulation,” (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). 
Experimental manipulation involves introducing the concepts of free will or 
determinism to participants. Thereafter, participants are placed into an experimentally 
conceived social situation for observation, whereupon measurement of change is 
needed. When considering measurement processes, psychologists have developed 
multiple instruments, such as the Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale, for 
consequential analyses (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). These two categories of assessment 
exist independently of one another. However, evidence has suggested that the most 
effective means of determining the effects of sense of agency on human behavior and 
cognition is by utilizing these two categories in tandem (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).  
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Through these processes, researchers have established a correlation between human 
agency and both cognition and behavior (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). 
Higher Sense of Agency 
 Upon analysis of the consequences associated with human agency, many 
researchers have noted that human cognition and behavior are significantly affected. 
A higher sense of agency is characterized by a greater belief in free will. Researchers 
have indicated that as an individual possesses a higher level of agency, they are more 
likely to experience positive cognitive effects as well as to exhibit more prosocial 
behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Within the cognitive realm, a heightened 
sense of agency has been intimately linked to increased beliefs of self-efficacy. This 
self-efficacy belief is inherently intertwined with the concept of individual 
motivation. Bandura (1989), a lead researcher in this domain, has suggested, “self-
efficacy beliefs determine … level of motivation” (p. 1176). Cognitively, individuals 
with a high sense of agency have also illustrated heightened life satisfaction and 
meaningfulness. Sense of agency, as researchers have indicated, facilitates 
attributions of moral responsibility. In addition to these cognitive effects, a 
heightened sense of agency produces an increased likelihood for the exhibition of 
prosocial behaviors. Prosocial behaviors are those that are socially desirable and 
intended for the benefit of others. These behaviors are characterized by empathy and 
a concern for the well-being and rights of other individuals (Knickerbocker, 2003). 
Ultimately, it can be seen that a greater belief in free will is correlated with positive 
cognitive effects (e.g., self-efficacy, meaning in life, and moral attribution) and 
prosocial behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).  
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Positive cognitive effects. When considering the notion of heightened levels 
of human agency, evidence suggests that individuals experience positive cognitive 
effects. One such cognitive benefit is an increased belief in self-efficacy. Albert 
Bandura (1989), contra Skinner, argued that humans do have agency, and noted that 
self-efficacy functions as the most central and pervasive mechanism for human 
agency. Self-efficacy is characterized as a person’s belief in his or her capabilities as 
well as their ability to exercise control over events that affect their lives (Bandura, 
1989). An imperative function of thought systematically stems from this concept. 
This idea of self-efficacy enables individuals to predict their own ability to influence 
the environment and subsequent events, thus creating the means for exercising 
control. Belief in individual capabilities influences the type of scenarios that are 
psychologically constructed and reiterated. Those with high self-efficacy, as attained 
through heightened sense of personal agency, are more inclined to materialize 
positive scenarios that function as guides for behavior (Bandura, 2006). This 
additionally enhances performance within a particular domain. These individuals can 
also exert influence over their selective processes so as to engender beneficial 
environments. Conversely, perceptually inefficacious individuals primarily focus on 
negativity and simulations that can go wrong, which typically undermines 
performance (Bandura, 1989). This self-efficacy is possible only as individuals 
believe they are able to operate situationally and within the spectrum of their 
capabilities. 
The concept of self-efficacy, and human agency as a result, is naturally 
interlaced with individual motivation. Motivation is typically characterized as the 
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reason for one’s direction and inclination to engage in a specific behavior. In 
addition, the term motivation encompasses the willingness of an individual to perform 
such a behavior (Lai, 2011). Evidence suggests that self-efficacy modulates levels of 
motivation. This is reflected in how much effort an individual is willing to exert, as 
well as how long they will persevere in the face of adversity (Bandura, 1989). The 
stronger that an individual believes in their ability to influence the future through 
their capabilities, the more persistent they will be in their endeavors. Such individuals 
will exert greater effort to master challenges, as well as to accomplish goals. Ordinary 
social reality is pervaded with impediments, adversities, and failures. People of low 
self-efficacy are liable to become convinced of the futility of their endeavors and 
subsequently cease their efforts. Conversely, efficacious individuals perceive such 
difficulties as surmountable through their capabilities, and functionally remain 
resilient (Bandura, 2006). In essence, heightened sense of agency fosters self-efficacy 
through the belief that individual capabilities can influence the future. This self-
efficacy produces motivational effects through perseverance and resiliency. Such 
motivational effects are feasible through the belief that one is free to influence future 
outcomes.  
In addition to increased self-efficacy and motivation, heightened sense of 
agency is positively correlated with self-perceived meaningfulness of life and life 
satisfaction (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & 
Lambert, 2016; Seto, Hicks, Davis, & Smallman, 2015). A deterministic view posits 
that the outcome of an event is the only outcome that could have materialized. As a 
result, this phenomenon engenders a reductionist perception of meaning in life, a key 
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existential theme. Existentially, humans impart meaning on their choices and the 
subsequent reality of the outcomes (Crescioni et al., 2016). When determinism 
systematically reduces an individual to the subjugation of external forces, sense of 
meaning is diminished. Conversely, high free will belief has been shown to increase 
life meaningfulness and satisfaction. Such indication of meaning is aided through a 
process known as counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual reflections are “mental 
representations of alternatives to past occurrences” that presuppose an outcome could 
have been otherwise (Seto et al., 2015, p. 243). These reflections illustrate causal 
inferences that create awareness of the sequence of events that led to current 
circumstances. Counterfactual thinking, and free will belief as a result, emphasize the 
mutability of individual action. Such reflections serve to accentuate the importance of 
prior events chosen by the individual and their influence on the events that occurred 
(Seto et al., 2015). Experiences are perceived as meaningful because they could have 
occurred differently, resulting in entirely different circumstances, which though 
hypothetical, enhances the sense of personal agency. Personal action has ultimately 
dictated the context that one exists within. As a result, free will belief allows one to 
impart and amplify meaning on the experiences caused by individual action through a 
seemingly infinite amount of possibilities, both counterfactual and future.  
Further evaluation of the positive cognitive effects associated with higher 
levels of human agency reveals that moral attribution is a closely related concept. 
Free will functions as a prerequisite for individual responsibility. As Moore (2016) 
has suggested, “sense of agency plays a key role in guiding attributions of 
responsibility” (p. 7). In order to hold an individual morally responsible for their 
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action, they must necessarily possess the capacity to choose different courses of 
action. Conversely, when genuine choice is deemed impossible, moral responsibility 
is undermined. The concept of moral attribution consequently produces cognitive and 
behavioral implications. Individuals are unable to utilize determinism as a viable 
excuse for immoral behavior (Shariff et al., 2014). In addition, this individual 
responsibility functions as an adaptive challenge to suppress antisocial behaviors and 
lapses of self-control. Morality also becomes imperative in the broader context of 
society. The capacity to hold individuals morally responsible for their actions allows 
for punishment. Punishment, in this sense, functions as a benefit to societal 
functioning through establishing cultural principles in the realm of morality and 
behavior (Clark et al., 2014). Cooperation and ethics, through fear of punitive 
measures, are also engendered as moral obligations when the notion of free will belief 
exists. Finally, this concept of morality functions as a means of deterring antisocial 
behavior and thereby promoting the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. It can be seen 
that free will implies moral responsibility, which acts as a positive cognitive and 
behavioral effect.  
Prosocial behaviors. A higher sense of agency has been positively correlated 
to beneficial cognitive effects. Such cognitive effects extend into the physical realm 
and incite prosocial behaviors. Free will belief enables humans to experience feelings 
of empathy. “Empathy has been described as an affective vicarious response, 
isomorphic to the emotion that provoked it” (Lepron, Cuasse, & Farrer, 2014, p. 1). 
This affective emotion essentially allows an individual to feel as another feels. 
Empathic responses emerge as individuals judge themselves to be responsible agents 
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and attribute morality to their actions. Such an emotion produces inherent 
implications in the regulation of social behaviors. Enhanced empathic response is 
closely linked and perceived as a trigger for prosocial behavior. This prosocial 
behavior is observed through human willingness to help, which empathy functions as 
a primary factor and indicator (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). 
Helping others is socially desirable and centrally related to the concept of being 
performed for the benefit of others. Belief in free will is positively associated with 
helping. As such, individuals with heightened human agency, and empathic concern, 
are more willing to help across situations and opportunities. It can thus be seen that 
“belief in free will is a valuable support for prosocial behavior” (Baumeister et al, 
2009, p. 267). Ultimately, high sense of agency engenders positive cognitive effects 
and prosocial behaviors, which is beneficial to society.  
Lower Sense of Agency  
 When considering the consequences of the sense of human agency, 
researchers have also observed that a lower sense of agency produces variant effects. 
A lower sense of agency is characterized by a decreased belief in free will, or a more 
deterministic worldview. As a result, researchers have indicated that as an individual 
possesses a lower level of agency, they are more likely to experience detrimental 
cognitive effects as well as the exhibition of antisocial behaviors (Baumeister & 
Brewer, 2012). Within the cognitive realm, a diminished sense of agency is correlated 
with increased negative affective processes. Individuals are likely to experience 
amotivation and an increased reliance upon instinct. Instinct, in this sense, refers to a 
set of behaviors, which are unlearned and result from an environmental stimulus. 
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Prosocial behaviors require the expenditure of personal resources such as time and 
energy. For this reason, individuals tend to default to innate responses of self-interest 
(DeWall et al., 2008). Amotivation additionally facilitates feelings of indifference and 
overall passivity throughout the lifespan. Such cognitive effects inhibit the individual 
and engender the exhibition of antisocial behaviors. Antisocial behaviors are those 
that are outside the realm of social acceptance and morality. Typically, these 
antisocial behaviors are identified by harmful and negative intentionality (Baskin-
Sommers, 2011). Individuals become more likely to act through naturally selfish 
impulses and to display increased aggressive tendencies. In addition, those who 
possess a deterministic worldview display a reduction in willingness to help others. 
Essentially, a lower sense of agency is correlated with negative cognitive effects and 
antisocial behaviors (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012).  
Negative cognitive effects. As an individual holds a lower sense of human 
agency, they experience an increase in negative affective processes. Affective 
processes include all feelings and responses related to behavior, knowledge, and 
beliefs (Merritt, 2011). These emotional reactions possess the capacity to alter the 
nature and course of individual cognition. For example, individuals constrained in 
these negative affectivities experience heightened levels of stress and depression. In 
addition, these individuals typically experience high levels of anxiety arousal 
(Bandura, 1989). Such affectivities arise as a result of decreased belief in self-efficacy 
as people doubt their capabilities to handle particular situations. Inefficacious 
thoughts produce apprehensive cognitions, which promote feelings of stress as 
individuals focus on deficiencies. Depression materializes when inefficacy produces 
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negative evaluations of one’s self-worth. This diminished self-worth aids in 
ruminative thoughts that constrain adaptive abilities. Finally, anxiety is engendered as 
individuals experience aversive cognitions coupled with an inability to alter perceived 
efficacy of thought control (Bandura, 1989). These negative affectivities also possess 
the capacity to affect biological systems, thereby producing adverse physiological 
effects, such as immunodeficiency (Bandura, 1989). Fundamentally, evidence 
suggests that inefficacious thoughts inhibit and impair level of functioning, both 
cognitively and behaviorally. Perceived inefficacy emerges as a result of diminished 
levels of personal agency.  
 Antisocial behaviors. In addition to these cognitive detriments, lower levels 
of sense of human agency produce effects on individual behavior. Humans, as 
philosophers and psychologists have suggested, have internal motivational conflicts. 
This motivational dissension involves natural inclinations towards selfish impulses 
and conflicting socially imposed prosocial motivations. Based upon evolutionary 
principles, researchers have indicated that humans are innately predisposed towards 
exhibiting selfish tendencies (Baumeister et al., 2009; DeWall et al., 2008; Harms, 
Liket, Protzko, & Schölmerich, (2017). From an evolutionary standpoint, organisms 
exhibit selfish tendencies for survival. It appears to be an automatic impulse for 
humans to act without concern for others. As a result, “ a significant amount of self-
control and mental energy is required to override this default” (Baumeister et al., 
2009, p. 261). Such an idea is intimately connected to the concept of amotivation 
brought about by low levels of human agency. Disbelief in free will possesses the 
capacity to serve as a subtle clue that exerting volition and self-control is futile. This 
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perceived futility inhibits individual willingness to exert energy on self-regulation. 
Without the capacity for self-regulation, individuals would enact all impulses, for 
which many appear to be antisocial in nature (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). Self-
regulation thus is imperative for constraining automatic antisocial tendencies (DeWall 
et al., 2008). Additionally, this reduction in volition willingness facilitates feelings of 
indifference and passivity, which promotes impulsivity. For this reason, it can be seen 
that “a belief in free will … is crucial for motivating people to control their automatic 
impulses in favor of more prosocial forms of behavior” (Baumeister et al., 2009, p. 
261). 
 Reduction in willingness to exert volition and self-regulation, brought about 
through decreased sense of human agency, produces implicit implications for 
behavior. Essentially, it possesses the capacity to allow socially undesirable and 
antisocial behaviors. Aggression functions as a natural impulse present in human 
beings. Typically, such aggressive impulses are consciously blocked by strong inner 
restraints. However, as self-regulation decreases, failure of these inner restraints 
increases (DeWall et al., 2007). This internal failure occurs regardless of the root 
cause of the anger. Disbelief in free will is thus correlated to an increase in 
manifested aggression. Stemming from these aggressive impulses, evidence suggests 
that individuals are more likely to perform acts of violence. Aggressive tendencies 
tangibly evince themselves at a higher rate than if constraints were available. A 
lowered inclination to exert volition and effort thus facilitates physical action on 
aggressive impulses (DeWall et al., 2007). In addition to this aggressiveness, humans 
also display selfish and passive actions. Individuals are less willing to help across an 
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assortment of situations and opportunities. This comes as a result of responding 
automatically to internal, negative impulses as opposed to exerting self-control. 
Human helpfulness intimately requires exertion of the self (Baumeister et al., 2009). 
Passivity towards others is consequently engendered through this lack of volition. 
Such passivity correlates to a reduction in willingness to assist others. Ultimately, 
“disbelief in free will led to an increase in aggression and a reduction in willingness 
to help” (Baumeister, et al., 2009, p. 267). As a result, it can be seen that diminished 
levels of human agency engender negative cognitive effects as well antisocial 
behaviors. 
Argument for this Study 
 An analysis of the research associated with human agency illustrates a gap in 
our knowledge about the importance of individual sense of agency. As an individual 
experiences heightened levels of belief in free will, they are more likely to experience 
beneficial cognitive effects. In addition, these cognitive effects are accompanied by 
an increase in the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, as an individual 
possesses diminished levels of free will belief, they typically experience detrimental 
cognitive effects. Antisocial behaviors materialize from a low sense of human 
agency. Such an association inherently engenders implications for both the individual 
and society as a whole. Individuals could potentially experience the benefits of 
positive cognitive effects, while society would observe an increase in socially 
desirable and empathic behaviors. This would simultaneously occur with a decrease 
in detrimental cognitions and antisocial behaviors. Despite this correlation, however, 
researchers have not yet attempted to experimentally prime and enhance free will 
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belief in humans. For this reason, in this study I sought to determine if human sense 
of agency could be primed and subsequently enhanced, resulting in increased 
expressions of prosocial behaviors.  
The hypotheses associated with this study, labeled as H1 and H2, were as follows:  
 H1: Individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and 
subsequently enhanced.  
 H2: Enhanced sense of agency will ultimately induce an increase in the 
exhibition of prosocial behaviors, as seen in individuals in an experimental 
group as compared to the control group.  
Method 
Participant Characteristics 
Potential participant population. Participants were primarily individuals of 
traditional undergraduate student age (18-23 years) at Concordia University – 
Portland. Contingent upon instructor permission to conduct the study, participants 
included those enrolled in introductory and upper division psychology courses. As a 
result, all years of study were eligible. This was done in an attempt to avoid a 
demographic representation bias from any specific area of study. Such a population 
was chosen in an effort to represent the general body of Concordia University in as 
accurate a way as possible. This sample was primarily drawn as a result of a 
convenience sampling strategy. 
Demographics. Participants were 130 undergraduate students at Concordia 
University- Portland. The age range of students was 17 – 52 with the majority of 
participants (approximately 82.4%) falling within traditional undergraduate age. 
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Females comprised 70.2% of participants with males composing the other 20.8%. The 
majority of participants (55.7%; n=73) identified as Caucasian. A total of 3.1% were 
African American, 17.6% were Asian/ Pacific Islander, 11.5% were Latino/a, and 
11.5% identified as other. When considering faith tradition, participants primarily 
identified as Christian (39.7%), Catholic (13.0%), Non-denominational Christian 
(10.7%) and Unaffiliated (10.7%). Multiple other faith traditions, from participants 
within the study, were claimed as well. The majority of participants were currently 
pursuing degrees in Business Administration (9.2%), Nursing (31.3%), and 
Psychology (23.7%). Students from various other majors were also present in the 
study. Finally, the study obtained data from 41.2% freshman, 27.5% sophomores, 
16.8% juniors, 13% seniors, and 0.8% fifth year seniors.  
Relationship/role with the participants. The researcher is a student at 
Concordia University – Portland. With the permission of various introductory and 
upper division psychology instructors, I obtained access to my intended participant 
population at Concordia University – Portland. Beyond the context of this study, I 
have had no contact with the participants concerning the nature of my experiment. 
Following the conclusion of this study, the majority of participants were debriefed of 
all deceptive practices involved via written communication. Through Qualtrics, 
participants were provided with a written debrief sheet that possessed downloadable 
capabilities. The debrief sheet outlined the entirety of the study and articulated the 
true nature of the research. At instructor request, the researcher verbally debriefed one 
class. Beyond such debriefing, I neither foresaw, nor anticipated any future contact 
following the conclusion of the study. 
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Recruited population included/excluded. In an attempt to avoid bias in the 
study, I sought to recruit a sample that was demographically representative of the 
Concordia – Portland student body. This assisted in reducing threat to external 
validity and generalizability. As a result, there was no exclusion criterion, as no 
groups were deliberately left out of the study. 
Sampling procedures 
Sampling method. This study utilized convenience sampling. Participants 
were those who participated on a voluntary basis and were provided the option to 
withdraw at any point in time. Each person who consented (see Appendix A) was 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions or one control condition. 
Permission was sought, and consequently obtained, from professors of general 
education courses.   
Sample size, power, and precision. To estimate required sample size a power 
analysis for a one-way ANOVA with three groups was conducted to arrive at a 
desired sample size of 160 participants (assumptions in the power analysis were as 
follows: alpha = .05; power = 0.80; medium effect size (f=0.25)).  
Data Collection Procedures 
Setting for data collection. This study was conducted in the classroom 
environment of Concordia University – Portland, contingent upon instructor 
permission. The experiment was conducted in introductory and upper division 
psychology courses at the beginning of scheduled class time. All participants 
completed a measure of sense of agency at the same time. Data collection was multi-
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site and the experiment was conducted in as many classrooms as necessary to attain 
the desired demographic representation. 
Study procedures 
Research design. Participants were provided with a constructed verbal 
summary of the study. Deception was used throughout this study. To avoid response 
bias, the terms “free will” and “determinism” were not utilized. If the participants had 
known the true nature of the study, social desirability could have arisen and prevented 
participants from behaving in an honest manner. Minor deception was thus inherently 
necessary during the completion of the initial sense of agency questionnaire. Such 
minor deception was associated with minimal risk for participants. Participants were 
informed of the true nature of the study at the conclusion of the study during 
debriefing.  
 All participants were asked to utilize a device with online capabilities and 
were provided, by the researcher, with the link to a website. This link directed 
participants to a data collection website named Qualtrics. Each participant was 
provided with an online informed consent form (see Appendix A). The informed 
consent form provided participants with the option to participate or not participate in 
the study. Students who did not wish to participate were redirected to a separate page 
thanking them for their time and consideration. This page also asked students to 
remain online so as not to distract others, which aided in participant anonymity. In 
addition, students were provided the option to withdraw at any point during the study 
if they did not wish to continue. Information that did not impact the required 
deceptiveness was included as well.  
SENSE OF AGENCY 36 
 For students who chose to participate, Qualtrics redirected participants to a 
pre-questionnaire designed to measures an individual’s sense of agency (described in 
the Measures and Covariates section below). Questionnaire items were utilized in an 
effort to obtain information on how each participant viewed free will and 
determinism. This acted as a measure of one’s sense of agency. Once the participants 
completed all constructs, participants were randomly assigned into one of two 
experimental conditions or one controlled condition, using the block randomization 
feature available in Qualtrics. Once randomly assigned, each participant was provided 
with a vignette describing a study of human agency. This vignette was based on the 
1964 free will study performed by Benjamin Libet (2011). The base vignette, along 
with those containing alternate endings, are available in Appendix C. 
The vignette was from the same “author and study,” but the results were 
altered based upon the experimental condition one was randomly assigned. As a 
result, in its three forms, this vignette acted as a compilation of measurement and 
experimental manipulation as introduced by previous studies (Paulhus & Carey 2011; 
Vohs and Schooler 2008). The conditions are labeled as C1 – C3 below. 
C1: (Control Condition) Participants read a vignette that simultaneously proves and 
disproves free will.  
C2: Participants read a vignette that proves free will as a product of human agency.  
C3: Participants read a vignette that indicates a disproval of free will and thus 
indicates a worldview of determinism as a product of human agency.  
Once all vignettes were read, the post sense of agency questionnaire was 
administered and completed. The total scores measured any changes in previous 
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beliefs on human agency, which indicated individual sense of agency. The pre/post 
difference score was the first of two dependent variables in the study. This is 
associated with hypothesis H1. 
 This aspect of the study utilized deception. At the conclusion of the 
questionnaire, participants were redirected to a page thanking them for their 
participation and informing them of the conclusion of the study. However, on the 
page, an additional note provided information concerning an opportunity for the 
exhibition of some form of prosocial behavior. This behavior was measured through 
some form of volunteer work performed with an inconvenience. This was 
conceptualized as an “opportunity that Concordia University desires to provide to all 
students who participated in research activities.” See Appendix B (IRB CU-07d 
document) for complete text for this portion of the experiment. Participants received a 
brief description of the opportunity, thus allowing them to review the potential task. 
Each participant was then provided with the opportunity to check whether or not they 
would like to volunteer. This measured prosocial intent as well as exhibition of the 
behavior on the part of the participants. As such, this constituted the second of the 
two dependent variables; this is associated with hypothesis H2. Students did not 
disclose their actual name; instead they disclosed their G number. This helped to 
maintain anonymity and reduced the potential for social desirability.   
 Participants were finally debriefed on the true nature of the study. The 
researcher explained the research and revealed the hypotheses involved. There were 
no anticipated adverse reactions to this study, and thus further services are likely not 
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required. Finally, participants were provided with an opportunity to pose questions to 
the researcher concerning the study and any further concerns.  
Measures and covariates. When considering measures of sense of agency, 
two categories exist. They are implicit and explicit measures utilized to determine 
free will belief. Implicit measures use perceptual differences between self and 
externally generated stimuli as measures of sense of agency. Conversely, explicit 
measures include scales and questionnaires (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). This study 
utilized explicit measures. The explicit measure utilized was the Free Will and 
Determinism Plus Scale, developed by Palhous and Carey, which contained 28 
questions divided into four subscales. Such subscales included Free Will, Scientific 
Determinism, Fatalistic Determinism, and Unpredictability. Analysis of the subscale 
revealed that the “alpha reliability of the Unpredictable scale is .72 … Free Will alpha 
= .70, Scientific Determinism alpha = .69, and Fatalistic Determinism alpha = .82” 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011, p. 101).  Paulhus and Carey (2011) subsequently conducted 
further testing on the construct ultimately producing evidence and support for its 
validity. 
While the Free Will subscale of the FAD Plus was used to assess individual 
sense of agency, behavioral intent was measured through single item, yes or no 
response to an upcoming “volunteer opportunity.” This volunteer opportunity, with 
perceived inconvenience, was provided at the conclusion of the study. The volunteer 
opportunity was offered under deceptive practices in order to conceal the true nature 
of the study and prevent participant desirability biases. That is, after what they 
perceived to be the conclusion of the study, participants were able to indicate, through 
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their single item response, whether or not they desired to engage in the volunteer 
opportunity. Volunteering is socially perceived as a desirable behavior. As a result, 
this desire to participate indicated behavioral intent and the exhibition of a prosocial 
behavior. The intent and prosocial behavior is associated with the second hypothesis 
of the study.  
Plan to deal with withdraw, “loss-to-follow-up,” or some reason to stop 
study. In the event a participant chose to withdraw, the corresponding questionnaire 
and consent form was discarded by Qualtrics.   
Declaration on Conflicts of Interest or lack thereof. I did not anticipate and 
there did not appear to be any conflicts of interest in this study.   
Data Analysis Procedures 
Data Management Procedures. As all participants responded to 
instrumentation via an online surveying platform (Qualtrics), data entry was not 
required. Instead, data as entered was exported from the platform directly to a format 
readable by Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Questionnaire results 
were analyzed through SPSS in an effort to filter for usable data. Frequencies and 
descriptive statistics were executed to check for errors and missing data in categorical 
and continuous variables. No missing data were obtained.  
Statistical Analyses 
 After assessment of compliance with associated statistical assumptions, 
analyses of group differences were conducted for each hypothesis. For hypothesis 
one, obtained data was analyzed utilizing a parametric test. A parametric test was 
used because the variable being measured was at the interval level. As a result, a one-
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way ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of various vignettes on individual 
sense of agency. ANOVA was utilized due to the presence of three groups within the 
independent variable.  
 For the second hypothesis of this study, a non-parametric test was performed. 
A non-parametric test was required due to the fact that the level of the data was not at 
least interval. Rather, the data was at the ordinal level of measurement. For this 
reason, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to analyze differences in behavioral 
intent among the three separate groups.   
Data Protection and Security Plan 
Due to the fact that names were not utilized in the course of this study, 
participant confidentiality was ensured. Student demographic information was 
recorded in an effort to reduce a demographic representation bias. However, such 
demographic information was coded so as to be unable to connect such information 
with individual participants. The codes were utilized to connect each students pre and 
post responses to one another. G numbers, during the volunteer opportunity, were 
utilized to connect the exhibition of prosocial intent to the randomized group. 
However, once all data had been entered, G numbers were removed from the dataset 
in an effort to effectively de-identify the data in digital storage. Completed 
questionnaires were accessible to the researcher, and thesis advisor when necessary. 
ANOVA results were stored on the computer of the researcher and protected under 
username and password.   
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Risks and Discomforts 
Even with the use of deception throughout this study, I did not anticipate any 
risks or discomforts for the participants. There did not appear to be any sensitive 
information contained within this study. The researcher attempted to mitigate any 
potential distress for participants experienced throughout the study. 
Benefits 
This study was beneficial because if the hypothesis is correct, then society 
will experience an increase in prosocial behavior by individuals. Belief in free will, as 
demonstrated above, is intimately linked to a reduction in antisocial behaviors. 
Priming or enhancing this sense of agency would seemingly enhance the exhibition of 
desired societal behavior. In addition, this study could be beneficial to participants. 
Current research has indicated that a higher sense of agency is correlated with 
cognitive benefits such as increased perceived meaning in life. If the experiment does 
prime sense of agency, then there is increased potential to experience more desirable 
cognitive processes. 
Costs and Compensations 
To ensure that participation is completely voluntary, participants were not 
compensated. Excluding compensation from this study aided in the avoidance of 
participant coercion. As a result, this study necessarily remained completely 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 For all 130 participants who consented to the study, the survey was performed 
to completion. As a result, no missing data were present. Participants were randomly 
assigned to three conditions. Randomized groups were those who received the free 
will vignette in Experimental Condition 1 (N = 41), those who received the 
determinism vignette in Experimental Condition 2 (N = 45), and those who received 
the base vignette in the Control Condition (N = 44). After utilizing ANOVA, no 
significant differences were obtained between groups with regard to age, sex, 
education, academic year, and marital status. As a result, confounding variables can 
be eliminated.  
For each participant, pre-to-post change scores on the Free Will subscale of 
the FAD Plus scale were calculated using SPSS. Students in Experimental Condition 
1 reported no changes in free will belief (M = .000, SD = 1.97), while participants in 
Experimental Condition 2 (M = .067, SD =2.85) indicated minimal positive changes 
in free will belief and participants in the Control Condition (M = -.091, SD = 2.34) 
exhibited negative changes in free will belief.  
Behavioral intent was measured using a single item response concerning a 
volunteer opportunity. Of the 130 participants within the study, approximately 14.6% 
(N=19) indicated a desire to engage in the prosocial behavior. Within these 19 
participants, 7.7% were in Experimental Condition 1 (N=10), 3.8% were in 
Experimental Condition 2 (N=5), and 3.1% were in the Control Condition (N=4). The 
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majority of participants (85.4%, N=111) did not express an increased exhibition of 
prosocial intent through the volunteer opportunity.  
Hypothesis 1: Priming Sense of Agency   
 The first question associated with this study was to test whether individual 
sense of agency could be enhanced with priming. Hypothesis one postulated that 
individual sense of agency possesses the potential to be primed and subsequently 
enhanced. To test H1, a one way between subjects ANOVA was conducted using 
group assignment as the independent variable and total change scores on the Free 
Will subscale of the FAD Plus as the dependent variable. 
The one-way ANOVA is a parametric test utilized for comparing multiple 
groups or conditions. However, the use of a one-way ANOVA requires that a set of 
assumptions be satisfied. Assumption one necessitates that the dependent variable 
must be measured at the interval or ratio level. Such variables must necessarily be 
continuous. When considering the independent variable, it should consist of two or 
more categorical, independent groups. Typically, a one-way ANOVA is utilized with 
three or more categorical groups; otherwise an independent samples t-test could be 
used. A third assumption is that an independence of observations is obtained. 
Participants cannot be in more than one group and different participants must be in 
each group. An approximate normal distribution of the dependent variable for each 
category of the independent variables should also be obtained. Finally, in order to run 
a one-way ANOVA, homogeneity of variances needs to be present in the data. 
The data associated with the first hypothesis of this study meets the criteria 
necessary for the use of an ANOVA. Upon analysis, the overall the mean FAD Plus 
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scores for the pre-questionnaire (M = 17.41, SD = 3.54) were lower than the overall 
mean FAD Plus scores of the post questionnaire (M = 17.42, SD = 3.42). Despite this 
increase in scores, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the change was not statistically 
significant, F(2, 127) = 0.954, p > .05.  
Hypothesis 2: Prosocial Behaviors 
 The second hypothesis associated with this study was to determine if 
heightened sense of agency would induce an increased exhibition of prosocial 
behaviors. A volunteer opportunity was deceptively presented at the conclusion of the 
post-questionnaire, with a single-item response option as indicated in the method 
section; this operationalized prosocial behavioral intent. Answers were entered by 
participants and subsequently coded within SPSS. Participants were separated into 
three groups based upon their randomly assigned condition and vignette.  
 In the event there is a lack of normality, as indicated by failure with regard to 
statistical assumptions, separate analyses must be conducted. ANOVA is a parametric 
test utilized for three or more groups. A Kruskal-Wallis H (KWH) test represents a 
non-parametric measure for the same design. Hypothesis two of this study does not 
meet the necessary criteria to be considered to possess normality. With regard to 
behavioral intent, the study utilized an ordinal level of measurement. As a result, it is 
more appropriate to run a Kruskal-Wallis H test for this hypothesis as opposed to an 
ANOVA.  
A Kruskal-Wallis H test was conducted to determine if intent to volunteer was 
different among the various groups. A Kruskal-Wallis H test revealed that no 
statistically significant difference was present, X2 (2) = 4.62, p > .05. Because no 
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overall effect was observed, the necessity of subsequent pairwise comparison was 
negated.  
Discussion 
 The present research was conducted to assess whether it was possible to prime 
individual sense of agency to enhance it and to determine if such enhancement would 
induce an increase in the exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Researchers in this 
domain have indicated that an increased belief in free will is associated with positive 
cognitive effects and an increased exhibition of prosocial behaviors. Conversely, a 
diminished belief in free will is correlated with negative cognitive effects and an 
increase in the exhibition of antisocial behaviors. The data reported on within this 
study reveal that the presentation of a vignette was not effective in altering individual 
sense of agency at a level that was statistically significant, at least as could be 
detected by the FAD Plus scale or could be consciously perceived. Rather, though in 
the predicted direction for each group, the mean of the overall scores varied only 
slightly after the presentation of various conditions. In addition, no significant 
difference was observed when considering the relation of various conditions to one 
other. Such a finding appears counter to prior research, as previous studies produced 
significant results in affecting sense of agency through the use of vignettes.  
 A second hypothesis was also assessed in this study. Through H2, I proposed 
that a heightened sense of agency would induce an increase in the exhibition of 
prosocial behaviors. The data did not support this. This hypothesis represented a gap 
in the prior research for this psychological area. Prior studies have attempted to 
determine whether a lowered sense of agency would lead to an increase in antisocial 
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behaviors. However, a gap existed wherein studies had not been conducted to 
determine if heightened free will belief would increase prosocial behaviors. The 
hypotheses of previous studies and the current study seemingly appear to be inverted 
of one another. Intuitively, as free will increases deterministic perceptions should 
decrease. In addition, as prosocial behaviors increase antisocial behaviors should 
diminish. Fundamentally, the inverse should remain true of both. Despite the presence 
of this relationship, the data of the current study are not congruent with the findings 
of previous studies.   
Limitations 
 Throughout the course of this study, multiple limitations inevitably 
manifested. One such limitation deals primarily with the presentation of the vignettes. 
The vignettes, due to the complicated nature of the subject of the study, were dense 
readings. Such density could have caused some participants to skim the readings 
rather than analyzing the vignettes carefully. Sparse reading of the vignettes would 
diminish the effectiveness of the conclusions and effectively reduce the potential for 
priming sense of agency in the participant. While this represents a potential limitation 
in this study, this did not appear to be the case in previous experiments. Previous 
experiments utilized a different delivery system. Physical materials were administered 
rather than provided online. Other studies could have also potentially negated this 
effect through requiring that participants construct an abstract of the text that was 
provided. This would likely create the perception, for the participant, that the vignette 
needed to be analyzed carefully.   
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A power analysis also produced the need for 160 participants. This is a 
relatively small sample size that may need to be expanded in future replications. 
Additionally, while the researcher and professors indicated that there was no 
compensation for participation, and conversely no risk for non-participation, the 
presence of a professor and the classroom environment could have increased 
participant coercion. Ultimately, the use of convenience sampling could produce an 
effect on the generalizability of the study.  
 When considering the second hypothesis associated with this study, a 
limitation emerged. The volunteer opportunity only provided for one available time 
and did not specify when the opportunity was occurring. As a result, multiple 
participants may have had prior commitments and were consequently forced to 
choose not to engage in the prosocial behavior. Such a limitation potentially reduced 
the number of participants who desired to engage in the volunteer opportunity and 
exhibit prosocial intent. Multiple other provided options may reduce such a conflict 
of interests.  
Future Directions  
 Within this particular domain, there exists the potential for future directions of 
study. One such direction, which would be valuable, would be to expand the intensity 
of the opportunity for prosocial behavior in order to determine the extent of prosocial 
intent. Another future direction with this particular research deals primarily with the 
time frame of the second hypothesis of this study. The prosocial intent and behavior 
was measured immediately after the proposed priming. As of now, it is unknown if 
the supposed priming would manifest itself for a brief or extended period of time. A 
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longitudinal study, though difficult due to the necessity of intense deceptive practices 
to reduce social desirability, would be beneficial in this regard. This particular issue 





















SENSE OF AGENCY 49 
References 
Aarts, H. & Van den Bos, K. (2011). On the foundations of beliefs in free will 
 intentional binding and unconscious priming in self-agency. Psychological 
 Science, 22(4), 532 – 537. doi:10.1177/0956797611399294  
Astore, R. A. (2016). "Examining Free-Will Through Spinoza and 
 Descartes." Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse, 8(02). Retrieved 
 from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1354 
Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. American 
 psychologist, 44(9), 1175 – 1184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-
 066X.44.9.1175 
Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a psychology of human agency. Perspectives on 
 psychological science, 1(2), 164-180. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
 6916.2006.00011.x 
Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2016). Dissecting Antisocial Behavior: The Impact of 
  Neural, Genetic, and Environmental Factors. Clinical Psychological 
 Science, 4(3), 500-510. doi: 10.1177/2167702615626904  
Baumeister, R.F., Masicampo, E.J., & DeWall, C. N. (2009). Prosocial benefits of 
 feeling free: Disbelief in free will increases aggression and reduces 
 helpfulness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 35. 260-268. doi: 
 10.1177/0146167208327217 
Baumeister R. F., Brewer L. E. (2012). Believing versus disbelieving in free will: 
 Correlates and consequences. Social & Personality Psychology Compass, 6, 
 736-745. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00458.x 
SENSE OF AGENCY 50 
Baumeister, R. F., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). Recent research on free will: 
 Conceptualizations, beliefs, and processes. Advances in Experimental Social 
 Psychology, 50, 1-52.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-800284-1.00001-
 1  
Bergner, R. M., & Ramon, A. (2013). Some implications of beliefs in altruism, free 
 will, and nonreductionism. The Journal of social psychology, 153(5), 598-618. 
 doi: 10.1080/00224545.2013.798249  
Binswanger, L. (1965). Being-in-the-world: Selected papers of Ludwig Binswanger. 
 Condor Books. 
Boss, M. (1963). Psychoanalysis and daseinsanalysis. 
Caruso, G. D. (2016). Free will skepticism and its implications: An argument for 
 optimism. Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society, ed. Elizabeth Shaw & 
 Derk Pereboom, Forthcoming. Retrieved from 
 https://philpapers.org/archive/CARFWS-2.pdf 
Clark, C. J., Luguri, J. B., Ditto, P. H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A. F., & Baumeister, R. F. 
 (2014). Free to punish: A motivated account of free will belief. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 106(4), 501-513. Retrieved from 
 http://cupdx.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1509
 629602?accountid=10248 
Crescioni, A. W., Baumeister, R. F., Ainsworth, S. E., Ent, M., & Lambert, N. M. 
 (2016). Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free 
 will. Philosophical Psychology, 29(1), 41-63.doi: 
 10.1080/09515089.2014.996285 
SENSE OF AGENCY 51 
Cureton, A. & Johnson R. (2016). Kant’s moral philosophy. In the Stanford 
 Encyclopedia  of Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition). Retrieved from 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi- bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=kant-moral 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Stillman, T. F., & Gailliot, M. T. (2007). Violence 
 restrained: Effects of self-regulation and its depletion on aggression. Journal 
 of Experimental social psychology, 43(1), 62-76. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.  12.005 
DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. (2008). Depletion 
 makes the heart grow less helpful: Helping as a function of self-regulatory 
 energy  and genetic relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology 
 Bulletin, 34(12), 1653-1662. doi: 10.1177/0146167208323981 
Dewey, J. A., & Knoblich, G. (2014). Do implicit and explicit measures of the sense 
 of agency measure the same thing?. PloS one, 9(10), e110118. 
Feldman, G. (2017). Making sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and 
 important construct. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 11(1).    
 doi:10.1111/spc3.12293 
Graham, G. (2015). Behaviorism. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
 2017 edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/  
Greening, T. (2006). Five basic postulates of humanistic psychology. Journal of 
 Humanistic Psychology, vol. 46, 239. Retrieved from 
 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002216780604600301 
Grillaert, N. (2006). Determining One's Fate: A Delineation of Nietzsche's 
 Conception of  Free Will. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 31(1), 42-60. 
SENSE OF AGENCY 52 
 doi:10.1353/nie.2006.0002 
Hanna, R. (2016). Kant’s theory of judgement. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
 Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition). Retrieved from 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/ 
Harms, J., Liket, K., Protzko, J., & Schölmerich, V. (2017). Free to help? An 
 experiment on free will belief and altruism. PloS one, 12(3), e0173193. 
 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173193  
Kant, I. (1972). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Hutchinson University 
 Library. 
Kant, I. (1997). Kant: Critique of practical reason. Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (2013). Immanuel Kant's critique of pure reason. Read Books Ltd. 
Kisner, M. J. (2011). Spinoza on human freedom: Reason, autonomy and the good 
 life. Cambridge University Press. 
Knickerbocker, R. L. (2003). Prosocial behavior. Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
 University, 1-3.Retrieved from https://www.learningtogive.org/ 
 resources/prosocial-behavior 
Lai, E. R. (2011). Motivation: A literature review. Person Research’s Report. 




 tivation _A_Literature _Review_Research.pdf 
SENSE OF AGENCY 53 
Leiter, B. (2007). Nietzsche’s theory of the will. Philosopher’s Imprint, vol. 7, 1-15. 
 Retrieved from https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/nietzsche-s-
 theory- of-the-will.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0007.007;format=pdf 
Leiter, B. (2015). Nietzsche’s moral and political philosophy. In the Stanford 
 Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition). Retrieved from 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/   
Lepron, E., Causse, M., & Farrer, C. (2015). Responsibility and the sense of agency 
 enhance empathy for pain. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: 
 Biological Sciences, 282(1799), 20142288. doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2288 
Libet, B. (2011). Do we have free will?. Conscious will and responsibility, 1 – 10.  
Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh 
 University Press. 
Merritt, S. M. (2011). Affective processes in human–automation interactions. Human 
 Factors, 53(4), 356-370. doi:10.1177/0018720811411912 
Moore, J. W. (2016). What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? 
 Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1272. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 
Mounier, E., Marcel, G., de Rougemont, D., Maritain, J., Buber, M., Levinas, E., & 
 Brightman, E. S. (2015). Humanistic psychology. Retreived from 
 https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Humanistic-
 Psychology.pdf 
Mueller, R. (2017a). Carl Rogers: Person centered theory [PowerPoint slides]. 
 Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-
 poPPcSrwzJcWdRVGdNV1A5dzA/view  
SENSE OF AGENCY 54 
Mueller, R. (2017b). Skinner – Comparative framework [PowerPoint slides]. 
 Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-
 poPPcSrwzJUmlKR0lJMzJyQWc/view  
Nietzsche, F. W. (1927). Beyond good and evil. Prabhat Prakashan. 
Nietzsche, F. W. (2007). Twilight of the Idols with the Antichrist and Ecce Homo. 
 Wordsworth Editions. 
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. (2011) The FAD-Plus: measuring lay beliefs regarding 
 free will and related constructs. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 96–
 104. doi:10.1080/00223891.2010.528483  
Pescitelli, D. (1996). An analysis of Carl Rogers’ theory of personality. Retrieved 
 from http://pandc.ca/?cat=carl_rogers&page=rogerian_theory 
Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships 
 as developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: 
 A study of a science (Vol. 3, pp. 184-256). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rychlak, J. F. (1981). Introduction to personality and psychotherapy: A theory-
 construction approach (2nd ed). New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
Sandum, E. (2012). Ethics and Freedom within Spinoza's system of necessary 
 determinism (Master's thesis). Retrieved from 
 https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/24874/sandum.ellen_mastero
 ppgave.pdf?sequence=2 
Seto, E., Hicks, J. A., Davis, W. E., & Smallman, R. (2015). Free will, counterfactual 
 reflection, and the meaningfulness of life events. Social Psychological and 
 Personality Science, 6(3), 243-250. doi: 10.1177/1948550614559603  
SENSE OF AGENCY 55 
Shariff, A. F., Greene, J. D., Karremans, J. C., Luguri, J. B., Clark, C. J., Schooler, J. 
 W.,... & Vohs, K. D. (2014). Free will and punishment: A mechanistic view of 
 human  nature reduces retribution. Psychological science, 25(8), 1563-1570. 
 doi: 10.1177/0956797614534693  
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. Penguin Books Ltd. 
Spinoza, B. (2009). The Ethics. The Project Gutenberg EBook.  
Staddon, J. E., & Cerutti, D. T. (2003). Operant conditioning. Annual review of 
 psychology, 54(1), 115-144. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145124 



















Research Study Title: Sense of Agency and Enhancement of Prosocial 
Behaviors   
Principal Investigator: Tyler Charlton     
Research Institution: Concordia University    
Faculty Advisor: Reed Mueller     
 
Purpose and what you will be doing: 
The purpose of this survey is to observe the psychological effects of individual 
sense of agency. We expect approximately 160 volunteers.  No one will be 
paid to be in the study. We will begin enrollment on January 10, 2018 and end 
enrollment on February 10, 2018.To be in the study, you will begin by 
providing answers to a questionnaire administered by the researcher. You will 
then read a short passage before the administration of a post questionnaire. 
Doing these things should take less than thirty minutes of your time.   
Risks: 
There are no risks to participating in this study other than providing your 
information. However, we will protect your information. Any personal 
information you provide will be coded so it cannot be linked to you. Any name 
or identifying information you give will be kept securely via electronic 
encryption or locked inside the file cabinet of the researcher. When we or any 
of our investigators look at the data, none of the data will have your name or 
identifying information. We will only use a secret code to analyze the data.  
We will not identify you in any publication or report.   Your information will be 
kept private at all times and then all study documents will be destroyed 3 
years after we conclude this study. Some details of the project may not be 
made to me until my session is completed. I realize at the completion of my 
session that I have the option of withholding the responses I have provided 
from subsequent analysis.  
Benefits: 
Information you provide will help advance knowledge of human cognition and 
behavior.  In addition, this will aid in the benefit of deepening the knowledge 
of human agency. You could benefit this by assisting in the study to illustrate 
a relationship between sense of agency and cognitive effects.  
Confidentiality:  
This information will not be distributed to any other agency and will be kept 
private and confidential. The only exception to this is if you tell us abuse or 
neglect that makes us seriously concerned for your immediate health and 
safety.   
Right to Withdraw: 
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Your participation is greatly appreciated, but we acknowledge that the 
questions we are asking are personal in nature. You are free at any point to 
choose not to engage with or stop the study.  You may skip any questions 
you do not wish to answer. This study is not required and there is no penalty 
for not participating. If at any time you experience a negative emotion from 
answering the questions, we will stop asking you questions.   
Contact Information: 
You will receive a copy of this consent form.  If you have questions you can 
talk to or write the principal investigator, Tyler Charlton at 
tycharlton9@me.com If you want to talk with a participant advocate other than 
the investigator, you can write or call the director of our institutional review 
board, Dr. OraLee Branch (email obranch@cu-portland.edu or call 503-493-
6390). 
Concordia Student Counseling: 
In the event that this study makes you experience feelings of discomfort or 
irritation, Concordia has on campus counseling services. The counseling 
center is located on the lower level of Centennial hall in offices 8, 9, 10, and 
11. An appointment can also be made with the counseling staff by phone at 
503-493-6499 ext. 1. 
 
Your Statement of Consent:   
I have read the above information. I asked questions if I had them, and my 
questions were answered.  I volunteer my consent for this study. 
 
_______________________________                   ___________ 
Participant Name       Date 
 
_______________________________                   ___________ 
Participant Signature      Date 
 
_______________________________                   ___________ 
Investigator Name                 Date 
 
_______________________________                   ___________ 
Investigator Signature       Date 
 
Investigator: Tyler Charlton; email: tycharlton9@me.com 
c/o: Professor Reed Mueller; 
Concordia University – Portland 
2811 NE Holman Street 
Portland, Oregon  97221  
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Appendix B 
Volunteer Opportunity 
 Concordia University wishes to provide a volunteer opportunity to all students 
who participate in research activities. Concordia has instituted a program for the 
assistance of the homeless community. Volunteers will assemble packages of food as 
a part of this service. The service will occur at 7:00 a.m. in the Cafeteria on a 
Saturday morning. We will be in contact confirming all those who have expressed a 
desire to volunteer.   
 
______      Yes, I wish to volunteer 
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Appendix C 
Experimental Vignettes 
Experimental Condition 1 (Free Will) 
 In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the 
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking, particularly in the 
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had 
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp. 
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher 
cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the 
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action, 
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the 
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing 
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this 
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s 
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that 
conscious action preceded neural activity by approximately 200 milliseconds. These 
results imply that humans possess free will and can exert control over their lives. 
Experimental Condition 2 (Determinism) 
In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the 
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking particularly in the 
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had 
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp. 
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher 
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cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the 
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action, 
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the 
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing 
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this 
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s 
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that neural 
activity preceded conscious action by approximately 200 milliseconds. These results 
imply that humans are subject to deterministic forces and are unable to exert control 
over their lives.  
Control Condition (Simultaneously Prove Existence of Both) 
In the year 1964, Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the 
field of neuropsychology. These experiments were groundbreaking particularly in the 
field of human consciousness. Participants to one of his classic experiments had 
electrodes from an electroencephalogram (EEG) taped to various places of their scalp. 
The EEG measures neural activity in the cortex, which is associated with higher 
cognitive processes. In addition, an oscilloscope timer was placed in front of the 
volunteers. Libet would then instruct participants to perform a simple motor action, 
such a flexing the wrist or pressing a button. Participants were asked to note the 
position of the timer when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act. Pressing 
the button also recorded the position of the timer. Following the collection of this 
data, Libet compared the timing of brain activity with the timing of the participant’s 
conscious decision to perform the simple motor activity. Results indicated that neural 
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activity and conscious action occurred simultaneously. These results imply that 
humans possess free will and are subject to deterministic forces at the same time.  
 
